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HE author of this book was Professor of Philosophy at the 
University of Western Australia from 1961 to 1981. He is so 
absurdly modest a man that his own name is not mentioned 
once in the book, although he gives space to scores of lesser lights 
than himself. Never mind: his name will not be forgotten now, at 
least while philosophy survives in Australia. For philosophy feeds 
constantly on its own history, and Selwyn Grave has written a 
splendid history of philosophy in this country up to 1980. How this 
feat was possible in a book of 252 pages, I do not understand. Grave 
combines institutional and individual history with detailed accounts of 
many hundreds of articles, books and conversations. He leaves out 
very little of importance, and is always accurate and fair, and still 
contrives at the same time to be readable. Since he has done it, it 
would be idle to brood over how he could possibly have done it. But 
the labour entailed by first surveying, and then organising and 
compressing the material of this book, can have been nothing short of 
colossal. 
What impression such a book must make on non-philosophers, I 
tremble to think. All these inexpressibly weird questions, about 
numbers, properties, individuals, space, time, causation, minds, 
possibility, probability, necessity, obligation, reasons, laws, God ... 
Not only are the questions weird individually, but collectively they 
form a mere chaos, defying all attempts to reduce them to a rational 
sequence. And then, none of the questions ever seem to get finally 
answered. It is a distressing scene, when you stand back and look at 
the whole of it. What is most painful about it is, the contrast it 
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presents with science, looked at as a whole. In fact it is scarcely 
possible for anyone, reading a book like this, not to wonder why 
there should be such things as philosophers at all; or at least to 
wonder why there should be so many of them, all paid huge amounts 
of money taken from other and more useful people. 
The latter question is absolutely unanswerable, in my opinion. But 
the former I believe I can answer. The vital clue to keep hold of is 
that people, and that includes all scientists, are only people after all: 
poor forked complicated creatures like yourself. Take Professor AB, 
our distinguished geneticist, member of the such-and-such, winner of 
the so-and-so: what a very clever man he must be! Well, so he is, in a 
way, but he is no glassy essence of genetic knowledge; he is lots of 
other things as well, and one of them is, that he happens to be a 
Methodist half-wit. Or take CD, a top physicist; but he also happens 
to take Uri Geller seriously, or believes that the latest physics 
vindicates Berkeley’s spiritualistic philosophy. Professor EF of pure 
mathematics, approaching retirement, begins to drive his busy 
colleagues wild by asking questions like ‘What the hell are numbers, 
anyway?’ GH finished up as an economist but the mainspring of his 
life was a vision he picked up from some 19th century philosophers, 
of a paradise in which ‘the toiling masses’ come into their own. (He 
hasn’t noticed that, where he lives, they knocked off toiling long 
ago.) The Professor of History, IJ, cannot always silence his own 
perplexities about historical inevitability, and finds himself asking, as 
philosophers do, what the truth-conditions are of a statement like 
‘Hitler would have won the war, if he had not attacked Russia’. KL, 
the Professor of Medicine, is drawn by his own new technology, if by 
nothing else, into agonised deliberations about the duties of a doctor 
to his patients. And so on. 
In other words, intelligent people, left to themselves, will 
philosophise anyway, late or soon, whatever special field of 
intellectual work they are engaged in, or even if they are engaged in 
none. The impulse to philosophy is in fact so natural and so strong 
that nothing is known, short of totalitarian terror, which can 
absolutely repress it. In a non-totalitarian society, then, philosophy 
will be done, and the only remaining practical question is how, or by 
whom, it is likely to be done best. 
And here comes in the final fact. There are philosophers who have 
thought longer and better about the ethics of medicine than the 
professor of medicine ever had time to do. There are philosophers 
who have thought longer and better about the two-slit experiment 
than physicists have. There are philosophers who have thought longer 
and better about the foundations of mathematics than a 
mathematician is ever likely to do. And so on. I am conscious that a 
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philosopher cannot say this of his profession without betraying a 
certain arrogance. Nevertheless it is literal truth. And it is a sufficient 
justification for the existence of a class of persons especially trained in 
philosophy. 
As a class, philosophers are never well-regarded by their university 
colleagues. The charge against us used to be, that we were lost in 
cloudy generalities. Nowadays it is usually the reverse: that we 
neglect ‘the great questions’ in favour of minute and pointless 
technicalities. This charge is not true, but it is entirely understandable 
that it should be made. The standard of rigour in philosophy has risen 
very steeply in the present century, and this fact on its own is 
sufficient to account for the breaking-up of single big questions into 
many smaller ones, and the consequent slowing down of the whole 
process. 
To the outsider, who cannot see the wood for the trees, the 
business naturally looks as though it could never have the remotest 
connection with anything that matters, so a theoretical chemist, for 
example, is apt to look at you and think, ‘There goes another blasted 
philosopher: what do we feed those fellows for?’ Well, such thoughts 
are not irrational; but they are wrong. At the same time as they 
despise us, our colleagues are also rather afraid of us. This too is not 
without a rational foundation! In argument of any kind, philosophers 
are hard men (some of whom are women), and most people do not 
care to tangle with us more than once or twice. In our company, as 
in another and more famous company of which the national poet 
sang, ‘The man that holds his own is good enough’.1 
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